However, with regard to administrative accountability for acts of corruption, Law 12.846/13 allowed administrative authorities to enter into leniency agreements with legal entities, with a reduction or exemption from sanctions in exchange for the company`s cooperation in the investigation. In the second panel, North American lawyer William “Bill` Burck, managing partner of the law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan, explained in Washington D.C. a brief explanation of how clemency agreements work in his country. There is a lot of flexibility, there are not too many legal requirements that limit what can and cannot be done,” he said. 2) If individuals also apply for a legal motion, leniency negotiations should be conducted in parallel or after the negotiation of individuals` arguments (note that a leniency agreement signed under the Clean Companies Act does not protect individuals from criminal liability under the Brazilian Penal Code) (Guideline 2); The signing of the plea [pt] resulted in several emanations of Operation Car Wash outside Brazil, particularly in North and South America.  The CGU is authorized to enforce leniency agreements within the framework of the federal executive and in cases where harmful acts are committed against the foreign public administration. The main problem related to Brazilian leniency contracts with companies is the last mentioned in the post: the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption procedures in Brazil. The country has leniency agreements with companies that are only involved in corruption in the operation of the automobile. This investigation is an exception to the general rule of impunity in Brazil, which favours criminals and corruption agents. This will allow me to ensure that there will be no leniency agreement outside of Operation Car Wash. Such a cooperation agreement will be particularly rare in cases of non-car-wash.
The Brazilian anti-corruption authorities should coordinate their work to jointly improve the effectiveness of the respective procedures, instead of fighting for exclusive power, negotiating and signing leniency agreements. This would be a first step towards improving the country`s anti-corruption system. Without this coordinated attitude, it is difficult to envisage thinking only by correcting breaches of the corresponding legislation. And it is this imputation of the Attorney General – MP, represented in the figure of the Attorney General of the Republic, to interfere in the field of the leniency agreement, as happened in the case of Operation Car Wash, which is being discussed. Would it be the exclusive competence of the CGU to discuss the terms of the leniency agreements or could the Member claim that responsibility? Hey, Maura! Your point is very important. Some argue that institutional diversity in Brazil has contributed to the recent successes of the fight against corruption. (For example, in English, Carson and Prado, 2016 – www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976916300564). In theory, institutional diversity not only offers some controls to others, but also creates a race, a quarrel for results. However, in practice, these institutions are constantly competing for more power and relevance, resulting in constant coordination problems and a confusing accountability system. It is difficult to know which of these effects predominates. With regard to leniency agreements in particular, I think that this type of institutional diversity creates more problems than benefits, at least in the Brazilian reality.